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SECTION 13(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT: AFTER TOUCHE ROSS
AND TRANSAMERICA, DOES AN
ISSUING CORPORATION HAVE AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
The burden of enforcing the disclosure requirements ofsection 13(d) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act statutorilyfalls upon the SEC. In recent years, however, those
persons entitled to such disclosure-issuers of securities registered under the Ex-
change Act-have attempted to enforce section 13(d) by means of an impliedprivate
cause of action for injunctive relief This Note examines the propriety of such ac-
tions, beginning with an analysis of section 13(d)'s historical background and legisla-
tive history. The Note then examines theprecedent andpolicysupportfor an implied
private action under section 13(d) and the Supreme Court's current standardfor
implying such actions. The Note asserts that although this standard will not support
an action under section 13(d), the needfor supplemental enforcement of the securties
laws should be recognized To this end, the Note concludes, Congress should adopt
spec#Fc amendments to the Exchange Act that would grant an express private rem-
edy.
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 13(d) was added to the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 (Exchange Act) by the Williams Act amendments
of 1968.2 Under the provisions of section 13(d), any person
who acquires more than five percent of an equity security
registered under the Exchange Act3 is required to file a Schedule
1. Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), codfed at 15 U.S.C.
78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
2. The Williams Act amended the Exchange Act by adding sections 13(d) and (e)
and sections 14(d)-(f), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), codFed at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d) and (e), 78n(d)-(]) (1976). The Williams Act also amended section 12(i), 15
U.S.C. § 781(i) (1976). See notes 28-56 infra and accompanying text.
3. "Almost any arrangement that takes A's money and gives it to B to manage for
[A's] benefit may be deemed to be a security." D. VAGTs, BAsic CORPORATION LAw 832
(1979).
An "equity security" is one that represents a shareholder's interest rather than a
creditor's .... The borderline is somewhat difficult to draw at times but factors
pointing to an equity security include entitlement to dividends (not interest), a
right to vote, an absence of a right to a return of the amount contributed at a fixed
date.
Id. at 826. Equity security is commonly represented by shares of stock. Registration under
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(d)
13DI with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC)
within ten days of the acquisition. A copy of the statement must
also be sent to the issuing corporation.5 The Schedule 13D must
disclose the purchaser's 6 identity and background, purpose in ac-
quiring the stock, source of financing, extent of acquisition and
arrangements or contracts with other persons concerning the
stock.7
the Exchange Act involves registration of the security under section 12 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). Id. at 831.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. I 1979), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1-.13d-102 (1980).
5. The issuing corporation is sometimes referred to as the "target corporation" See,
eg., Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subeommn on Securities of the Senate Comn on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 247, 249 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. For the
purposes of this Note, however, "issuing corporation" will be used to avoid confusion with
legislation specifically directed at tender offers. For a discussion of this distinction, see note
33 infra.
6. A person may also acquire stock by inheritance or gift. See note 41 infra and
accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, however, the acquirer will be referred to
as the purchaser.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) provides:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this
title, or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been
required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section
781(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall,
within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its
principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, sent to each exchange
where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing
such of the following information, and such additional information, as the Com-
mission may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors-
(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the na-
ture of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom
or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected,
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is represented
or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise
obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a descrip-
tion of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except that where a
source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as
defined in section 78c(a)(6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so re-
quests, the name of the bank shall not be made available to the public,
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with
any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving
the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts
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A purchaser who has acquired the requisite amount of stock
and either fails to fie a Schedule 13DI or files a false or mislead-
ing statement9 becomes subject to express statutory sanctions.
One such sanction, imposed on a purchaser for filing a false or
misleading statement, makes that individual liable under section
18(a) of the Exchange Act to any person "who, in reliance upon
such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price
which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance. ... 10 Moreover, if no statement is ified, the SEC may
seek to compel the filing of a truthful Schedule 13D by bringing a
suit for injunctive relief under the authority of section 21 of the
Exchange Act."l
If the issuing corporation or its shareholders fail to satisfy ei-
ther the purchaser/seller or reliance requirements of section
18(a),12 or if the SEC fails to seek enforcement under section 21,'1
the purchaser's violation of section 13(d) will not be remedied. To
alleviate this problem, the federal courts have implied a private
cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d) for both
or calls, guaranties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or with-
holding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements,
or understandings have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.
8. See notes 69-75 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 81-131 infra and accompanying text.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a) does not create liability for failure to file.
See notes 198, 201 infra and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976). See notes 282-84 infra and accompanying text.
12. The express damage remedy under section 18(a) is rarely litigated because of its
"double-barreled" causation requirement. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRiTiES REGULATION 1752 (2d
ed. 1961).
Not only must the Section 18(a) plaintiff demonstrate that he bought or sold the
security and that the statement or omission sued upon was false or misleading, he
must also shoulder the heavier burden of proving (1) that his damages resulted
from reliance on the false or misleading information, and (2) that the purchase or
sale price was affected by that information.
Report ofthe Advisory Comm. on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 678 (1977). See Stromfeld v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Stromfeld a shareholders suit for damages
under section 13(d) was dismissed, because the shareholder failed to meet the section 18(a)
causation requirements. The court noted that "[slection 18 requires that a plaintiff estab-
lish knowledge of and reliance upon the alleged misstatements contained in any document
filed with the S.E.C." Id. at 1268. Accord, W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith,
Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800 (D. Neb. 1979); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enter-
prises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). Because
of the difficult burden of proving causation under section 18(a), one writer contends that an
implied cause of action for damages should exist under section 13(d) without a showing of
actual reliance and causation. See Comment, Private Rights ofActionfor Damages Under
Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1980).
13. See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
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the issuing corporation and its shareholders. 4 Of these potential
plaintiffs, the issuer is generally in a better position than its share-
holders to enforce section 13(d) because it has the resources and
self-interest "vital to maintaining an injunctive action."'' 5
Until recently, no federal court had denied an issuing corpora-
tion the right to assert an implied cause of action for injunctive
relief under section 13(d). In 1980, however, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois dismissed an issuing corporation's
injunctive action in Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A
Car,'6 Gateway held that "section 13(d) cannot be fairly read to
imply a private right of action for injunctive relief on behalf of
issuing corporations such as Gateway."' 7 The district court's deci-
sion was based on two recent Supreme Court cases-Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redingtont8 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis' 9-- which denied the implication of private damage reme-
dies under the federal securities laws.20
The Gateway decision was rejected by the District Court for
the Western District of Michigan in Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin
Industries, Inc. 2 1 and was later cited with approval by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Sta-Rite Industries,
Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 22 This conflict among the district courts calls
into question the propriety of granting to an issuing corporation
an implied private cause of action for injunctive relief under sec-
tion 13(d).
In analyzing the issue of whether an issuing corporation may
enforce section 13(d) disclosures through an implied cause of ac-
tion for injunctive relief, this Note first discusses the historical
background of section 13(d). 3 The Note then analyzes the
Supreme Court's standard for implying private causes of action
from federal regulatory statutes.24 In addition, the Note applies
14. See notes 81-99 infra and accompanying text.
15. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,719 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972). See notes 81-90 infra and accompanying text.
16. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. IlM. 1980). See notes 100-18 infra and accompanying text.
17. 495 F. Supp. at 99.
18. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
19. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
20. See notes 173-235 infra and accompanying text.
21. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980). See notes 119-26 infra and accompanying
text.
22. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See notes 127-31 infra and accompanying
text.
23. See notes 28-136 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 137-235 infia and accompanying text.
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that standard to section 13(d) 25 and discusses the policy considera-
tions involved in granting or denying an issuing corporation in-
junctive relief under section 13(d).26
Touche Ross and Transamerica have raised doubts about the
enforceability of the Williams Act. The SEC, therefore, has pro-
posed an amendment to the Exchange Act which would expressly
provide for private causes of action. This Note outlines and
briefly discusses that proposal. 27  The Note concludes that, be-
cause of the present Court's strict standard for implication and
because the Court has rejected arguments in favor of supplemen-
tal enforcement, Congress must grant to issuing corporations an
express private cause of action for injunctive relief under section
13(d).
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Williams Act
An axiom of American securities regulation holds that "[t]he
keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is
disclosure. ' 2 Yet, in the early 1960's, it became apparent that an
important part of American business strategy-the corporate take-
over attempt-was not subject to the far-reaching disclosure re-
quirements of the securities laws. 9 Prior to that time, the absence
of disclosure was not a problem because "corporate takeover at-
tempts had typically involved either proxy solicitations, regulated
under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act,t301 . . . or exchange
offers of securities, subject to the registration requirements of the
1933 Act t3 t1 ... -32 However, the securities laws substantially
failed to regulate corporate takeovers by the means of cash tender
offers or, more important to this inquiry, the open market acquisi-
tion of an issuing corporation's stock.3 3
25. See notes 236-95 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 296-339 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 340-50 infra and accompanying text.
28. Report ofSpecial Study ofSecurities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 1 (1963).
29. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 24,664 (1967).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976). "A proxy is a power given by a shareholder to another
person to vote his (or her) share(s) of stock." D. VAGTS, supra note 3, at 830.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
32. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). See notes 164-71 infra and
accompanying text.
33. S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). A former Chairman of the Com-
mission explained such transactions, stating:
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In 1965, Senator Harrison Williams introduced a bill designed
to close this regulatory gap.34 He maintained that some form of
disclosure of these unregulated takeover attempts was "the only
way that corporations, their stockholders, and employees" could
adequately prepare "in advance to meet the threat of the takeover
specialist."35 His original bill, S. 2731,36 required that "any sub-
stantial accumulation of shares. . must be preceded by the filing
of public information . . . ." S. 2731 was designed to protect
incumbent management from "industrial sabotage" resulting from
reckless corporate raids on "proud old companies. '3
S. 2731 was later revised on the recommendation of the SEC.39
At that time, the SEC foreshadowed the present section 13(d) by
proposing that disclosure be made within five days after the acqui-
sition.' This allowance for after-the-fact disclosure was advised
because, as the SEC noted, "[W]e envision some types of situa-
tions in which compliance with an advance notice requirement
would be impossible, such as acquisition by inheritance or by gift
A tender offer is quite different from the ordinary market transaction with
which the average investor is familiar. In so far as it is an offer at all it is subject
to complex and sometimes deceptive conditions. Rather it is an invitation to the
public security holder who "tenders" his security to give the other party an op-
tion--to be exercised only if certain minimum shares are tendered within a speci-
fied time and perhaps specifying a maximum which the original "offeror" is
prepared to take-but giving him discretion to accept a lesser or larger amount or
to extend the time limits. Tendering in response to such an offer involves deposit
of the public security holder's shares or obtaining a guarantee from a stock ex-
change member or other financially responsible person that they will be depos-
ited.
Not all acquisitions of substantial blocks of securities are made by means of
tender offers. A corporation or individual-or group of corporations or individu-
als--can acquire a substantial block of stock of a company through a program of
purchases in the open market, or through privately-negotiated purchases from
substantial stockholders, and thus achieve the power to influence the management
and control of the corporation, without the other stockholders even becoming
aware of this development.
Hearings Before the Subcomra on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm on Interstate
andForeign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
34. 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965).
35. Id. Senator Williams remarked: "In recent years we have seen proud old compa-
nies reduced to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds
from sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets,
later to split up most of the loot among themselves." Id. at 28,257.
36. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
37. Id. at 28,259.
38. Id. at 28,257-58.
39. 112 CONG. REc. 19,003 (1966).
40. Id. at 19,004, 19,006. As enacted, section 13(d) requires disclosure within ten days
after the acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7
supra).
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of which the recipient had no advance notice."'" Moreover, Sena-
tor Williams remarked that "disclosure after the transaction
avoids upsetting the free and open auction market where buyer
and seller normally do not disclose the extent of their interest and
avoids prematurely disclosing the terms of privately negotiated
transactions."42
S. 2731 was not enacted, but was later reintroduced in 1967 as
S. 510.43 Hearings were held on S. 5104 and Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman of the SEC, urged passage with extensive testimony
and statements. There were, however, critics of S. 51041 who as-
serted that requiring disclosure of cash tender offers and open
market acquisitions would give incumbent management the upper
hand in the battle for corporate control.46 This outcome was
thought to be undesirable because it might serve to reinforce com-
placent management at the expense of healthy change.47
In response, the proponents of S. 510 stressed that the bill
could be drafted to avoid giving incumbent management an unde-
sirable advantage in the battle for control.4  The House Report
emphasized that, in its final form, the Williams Act:
avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It
is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors while at the same time providing the offeror and man-
41. Id. at 19,004.
42. 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967).
43. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The bill was co-sponsored by Senator Thomas
Kuchel. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967). S. 50 had the full support ofthe SEC, the New York
Stock Exchange, and the American Stock Exchange. Id. at 24,665.
44. Senate Hearings, supra note 5; Hearings on H.? 14475, S. 510 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter House Hearings].
45. House Hearings, supra note 44, at 64 (statement of Jordan H. Eskin). See also
Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 136-39 (statement of Professor Robert H. Mundheim); id.
at 128-29 (statement of Arthur Fleischer); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
46. See generaly Manne, Cash Tender Offersfor Sharer-A Repiy to Chairman Cohen,
1967 DuKE L. 231 (in reply to Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases
of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966)).
47. W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SEcuRrrIEs CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
387-88 (1979).
48. 113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967). S. 510 sought to parallel the neutrality of the existing
proxy regulations. Id. at 24,664. Neutrality is achieved in the Williams Act and the proxy
regulations by a grant of control to the SEC over the regulated conduct. In a proxy contest
this control is characterized by concerted attempts to avoid interfering with the strategy of
the participants. See Hearings on S. 879 Beore the Subcomin on Securities of the Senate
Comm on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1695, 1696 (1956) (remarks of for-
mer SEC Chairman Armstrong).
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agement equal opportunity to fairly present their case.4 9
After being unanimously recommended by the congressional
committees, S. 510 was enacted as an amendment to the Exchange
Act on July 29, 1968.50
Section 13(d) was one of S. 510's principal disclosure provi-
sions.51 This section, along with its implementing rules, 52 was in-
tended to make public every stock acquisition which could affect
the control of a corporation. 3 Section 13(d) disclosure made "the
relevant facts known so that shareholders would have a fair op-
portunity to make [investment] decisions."5 4  Information con-
cerning the purchaser's plans in acquiring the stock "if known to
investors, might substantially change the assumptions on which
the market price [of the issuing corporation's stock] is based."55
"Thus, the objective of Section 13(d) was to provide to sharehold-
ers and the marketplace relevant information and a fair opportu-
nity to evaluate the securities of a company in response to
acquisitions with the potential to affect or change control of the
company.' 56
49. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. See also S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
50. As originally enacted, the section 13(d) disclosure requirements were not triggered
until a purchaser had acquired more than 10% of an issuer's stock. In 1970 the amount of
stock required for disclosure was lowered from 10% to 5%. Section 13(d)(1) of the Ex-
change Act, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), codpied at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 11979). It appears that the amount was lowered to increase the
number of purchasers who would file. In some corporations if a purchaser acquired 10%
he or she would also acquire control. If the purchaser had to report at 5%, the investor in
the marketplace would have been warned before actual control at 10% occurred. S. REP.
No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). See also Hearings to Ascertain the Views of Hamer
H. Budge, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, on Problems in the Securi-
ties Industry Before the Subcomm on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
51. See Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownershio, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 853 (1971).
52. Schedule 13D and its accompanying rules may be found at 17 C.F.R.
240.13d-l-.13d-102 (1980).
53. Securities and Exchange Commission Report on Tender Offer Laws to the Senate
Comm on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980) [hereinafter
Commission Report].
54. S. REP. No. 550,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) (noted in Commission Report, supra
note 53, at 49).
55. Id.
56. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 49.
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B. Case Law
Unlike other sections of the securities laws,5" section 13(d)
does not expressly provide for private causes of action. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a
private cause of action may be implied from elements of the fed-
eral securities laws, even though the specific provisions are silent
as to private remedies.5 8 The Court has reasoned that if the con-
gressional purpose in enacting the statute would be undermined
without private enforcement, a private cause of action could be
implied in favor of those who were intended to be protected by the
statute.5 9
JI Case Co. v. Borak6 ° is the seminal case for the Court's rec-
ognition of implied private remedies under the federal securities
laws. In Borak, a shareholder of the J.I. Case Company alleged
that the merger of Case and American Tractor Corporation was
affected by the circulation of false and misleading proxy state-
ments in violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.6' The
trial court held that it had no power to redress the alleged viola-
tions under section 14(a) and that under section 27 of the Ex-
change Act, it could grant only declaratory relief.62 The Court of
57. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976);
Exchange Act, §§ 9, 16, 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t (1976).
58. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (referring to J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 60-68 infra).
59. Id. at 25. The concept of implication "developed in the context of the tort law
.... "The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 281 (1977) (citing RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 286(a) (1938), which provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to
do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another
if. . . the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of
the other as an individual .... .
60. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
61. Id. at 427. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an ex-
empted security) registered on any national securities exchange pursuant to sec-
tion 78! of this title.
The relevant SEC prescription was rule 14a-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
62. 377 U.S. at 427-28. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) provides in part:
The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the
[Vol. 31:532
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that federal
courts are empowered to grant remedial relief under section
14(a).63 In an opinion by Justice Clark, the Supreme Court found
that shareholders possessed an implied cause of action as to both
derivative and direct causes of action for losses resulting from de-
ceptive proxy solicitations in violation of section 14(a).64
Justice Clark reasoned that, although section 14(a) makes no
reference to private causes of action, "among its chief purposes is
'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availabil-
ity of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result."65 Jus-
tice Clark viewed the threat of civil damages or private injunctive
relief as a "necessary supplement to Commission action,"66 serv-
ing as an "effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy re-
quirements." 67 He concluded that, although "federal courts have
the power to grant all necessary remedial relief. . . [wlhatever
remedy is necessary must await the trial on the merits." 68
While Borak involved private remedial relief under section
14(a), the Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 69 also consid-
ered the merits of a petition by an issuing corporation for injunc-
tive relief under section 13(d). In Rondeau, the issuing
corporation, Mosinee Paper, brought suit to enjoin the purchaser
from voting his stock and from acquiring additional stock and to
compel him to divest himself of stock already purchased.70 The
purchaser, Rondeau, had failed to file a Schedule 13D because of
his unfamiliarity with the securities laws.7' When Rondeau
learned of his obligation, he fied a truthful Schedule 13D. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Rondeau, since Mosinee
Paper could not prove that it suffered the irreparable harm neces-
rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the
district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any
suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regula-
tions, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may
be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found.
63. Borak v. J.L Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963).
64. 377 U.S. at 431.
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
67. 377 U.S. at 432.
68. Id. at 435.
69. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
70. Id. at 55.
71. Id. at 53.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sary to sustain injunctive relief.7 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed and held that irreparable harm did not
need to be shown for Mosinee Paper to obtain injunctive relief for
Rondeau's violation of section 13(d).73
The narrow issue addressed on certiorari was whether the
"record supports the grant of injunctive relief . . . ."I In an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court answered this question
in the negative and reversed the Seventh Circuit by holding that
private litigants must show "irreparable harm" before they can
obtain injunctive relief in a suit under section 13(d).7 5
Because of the decision on this issue, the more fundamental
question-whether the corporation was entitled to bring the action
in the first instance-was not resolved. The Court, however, rec-
ognized the issue:
Although neither the availability of a private suit under the
Williams Act nor respondent's standing to bring it has been
questioned here, this cause of action is not expressly authorized
by the statute or its legislative history. Rather, respondent is
asserting a so-called implied private right of action established
by cases such as Borak.76
The Court's citation of Borak may indicate that the Court had
considered and accepted the issuing corporation's standing under
section 13(d) to assert an implied injunctive action, though it did
not expressly so rule.7 7 Moreover, Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized that the case "involve[d] only the availability of injunctive
relief to remedy a § 13(d) violationfollowing compliance. '78 He
cautioned that the case was not a decision on "whether or under
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a decree enjoining
a shareholder who is currently in violation of § 13(d) from acquir-
ing further shares, exercising voting rights, or launching a take-
over bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements. '79
As another court has noted, these two comments "add up to a
suggestion that the issuing corporation has a right to injunctive
72. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 693 (W.D. Wis. 1973). See
generally Kimberly Knitwear, Inc. v. Kimberley Stores, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1339, 1342
(W.D. Mich. 1971).
73. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 500 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1974).
74. 422 U.S. at 57.
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id. at 62.
77. See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1223 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981), discussed in text accompanying notes 91-99 ifa.
78. 422 U.S. at 59 n.9 (emphasis added).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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relief prior to compliance. ... o
Although Rondeau did not expressly hold that a private cause
of action exists under section 13(d), the courts of appeals which
have confronted the issue have held that an issuing corporation
does have standing to sue for an injunction under section 13(d).
The first court to so hold was the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in GAF Corp. v. Milstein.' Milstein expressly held that an
issuer does have standing to seek implied injunctive relief to rem-
edy a purchaser's false or misleading Schedule 13D.82
In its complaint, GAF alleged that the purchasers, the Mil-
steins, violated section 13(d) in two ways: by failing to file the
required Schedule 13D and later by filing a false statement. The
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted.8 3 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for a determination of Milstein's
liability under section 13(d) and the nature of appropriate relief.8 4
The appellate court noted that the Milsteins did not dispute
the existence of a private right of action under section 13(d) and
stated that "[t]he teachings of [Borak] are part of the ABC's of
securities law."8 5 Likewise, the Milsteins acquiesced to the stand-
ing of GAF as the issuer to assert the implied cause of action for
injunctive relief.8 6 In discussing this concession, the court asserted
that for practical reasons the standing of GAF was compelling:
"GAF, as the issuer, unquestionably is in the best position to en-
force section 13(d)."' 7 Similarly, GAF could constantly monitor
transactions in its stock and therefore best know whether someone
had failed to file a disclosure statement.88 The court also recog-
nized that GAF "has not only the resources, but the self-interest
so vital to maintaining an injunctive action."89 The opinion con-
cluded "that the obligation to file truthful statements is implicit in
the obligation to file with the issuer, and afortiori, the issuer has
80. Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
81. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
82. Although Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970) was decided before
Milstein, in Bath the target corporation's standing under section 13(d) was assumed with-
out discussion.
83. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. 453 F.2d at 722.
85. Id. at 719.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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standing under section 13(d) to seek relief in the event of a false
filing." 90
The most recent court of appeals decision to reaffim Milstein's
holding was Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Limited.91 Unitex, a manu-
facturer of textiles in Hong Kong, sought to acquire a substantial
equity position in Dan River, a large domestic textile manufac-
turer. After acquiring more than five percent of Dan River's
stock, Unitex failed to file the required Schedule 13D; the com-
pany subsequently sold a sufficient amount of stock to drop below
the five percent filing requirement.92 Unitex then established
Mannip, a corporate subsidiary in the British Virgin Islands, for
the sole purpose of acquiring Dan River stock.93 Unitex resumed
purchasing Dan River stock, again exceeded the five percent dis-
closure requirement and then transferred all of its Dan River
stock tojMannip. After the transfer, Mannip ified a Schedule 13D
stating that it had no "present intention to seek control. . .."9'
Dan River filed suit alleging that Unitex had failed to fie a
Schedule 13D and that Mannip's Schedule 13D contained mis-
leading statements and omitted other material information. 95 Af-
ter initially issuing a temporary restraining order, which was later
vacated, 96 the district court dismissed Dan River's suit on jurisdic-
tional grounds.97 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, citing Milstein as "conclusive on the issue both of stand-
ing and of jurisdiction.""8 The case was remanded to determine
whether Unitex had violated section 13(d). 99 Thus, all courts of
appeals which have addressed the issue have granted an issuing
corporation standing to seek injunctive relief under section 13(d).
The district courts have been less uniform. In Gateway Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car," for example, the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois announced that "section 13(d)
90. Id. at 720 (emphasis supplied).
91. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
92. Id. at 1218. Unitex denied that this sale was made to avoid filing a Schedule 13D.
93. Id. at 1219.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1221.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1223-24 (citing Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 611
F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979), which assumed, without discussion, that an issuing corporation
had standing to sue for an implied injunctive action; General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert,
556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977)).
99. 624 F.2d at 1228.
100. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. IMI. 1980).
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cannot be fairly read to imply a private right of action for injunc-
tive relief on behalf of issuing corporations ... ." 101 The issuer
in that case, Gateway Industries, alleged that although the pur-
chaser, Agency, had filed a timely Schedule 13D, the statement
failed to substantively comply with section 13(d). 1°2 Gateway,
therefore, sought an order requiring Agency to divest its Gateway
stock.103 Additionally, Gateway sought to enjoin Agency from ac-
quiring more stock, from voting the Gateway stock already
purchased and from exercising any control over Gateway man-
agement.1 4
The district court based its decision on Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington105  and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis."° In Touche Ross, the- Supreme Court dismissed a private
litigant's damage action brought under section 17(a) of the Ex-
change Act,10 7 concluding that no evidence of congressional intent
to create such a remedy existed.' The majority in Transamerica,
following the Touche Ross analysis for implication of private rem-
edies, applied principles of statutory construction to determine
whether Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of
1940109 (the Advisers Act) to afford a private cause of action. 011 In
Transamerica the Court found an implied private cause of action
for equitable relief under section 215111 of the Advisers Act, 2 but
denied an implied private cause of action for damages under sec-
tion 206113 of the same Act.114
After reviewing these authorities, the district court in Gateway
concluded that they compelled analysis of one dispositive is-
sue-whether Congress intended an issuing corporation to have
private injunctive relief under section 13(d)-and precluded refer-
101. Id. at 99.
102. Id. at 94. Gateway argued that the Schedule 13D was defective because "it failed
to provide adequate information about Agency; failed to disclose the source of borrowed
funds used to finance the purchase of Gateway shares; and misrepresented Agency's pur-
pose in acquiring Gateway shares." Id.
103. Id. at 94 n.3.
104. Id.
105. 442 U.S. 560 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 173-214 infra.
106. 444 U.S. 11 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 215-31 infra.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 177 infra).
108. See note 105 supra.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21, 54 Stat. 857 (1970).
110. 444 U.S. at 19-24 (1979).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 infra).
112. 444 U.S. at 19.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) (set forth in full in note 218 infra).
114. 444 U.S. at 24.
1981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ence to the general "remedial purposes" of the Act or the "desira-
bility of implying a private right of action."" 5 In analyzing the
statutory language and legislative history, the court determined
that the issuer was not within the class of persons especially bene-
fited by section 13(d). 1 6 According to the court, the statutory
scheme of enforcement did not allow for an implied private in-
junctive action in the hands of an issuing corporation." 7 Thus,
after answering in the negative the dispositive question of congres-
sional intent, the court held that Gateway could not maintain an
action for injunctive relief under section 13(d).118
Less than one month after the Gateway decision, the District
Court for the Western District of Michigan reached the opposite
conclusion and held in Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries,
Inc. 19 that an issuer did have an implied cause of action for in-
junctive relief under section 13(d).' 20 In Kirsch, the issuing corpo-
ration sought injunctive relief to remedy an allegedly false
Schedule 13D filed by the purchaser, Bliss & Laughlin Indus-
tries. 2 ' Citing Gateway, the purchaser contended that the issuer,
Kirsch, had no standing to sue.' 22 Yet the court rejected Gateway,
reasoning that Touche Ross and Transamerica did not apply to
section 13(d) actions. 23
The district court distinguished Touche Ross and Transamer-
ica on the grounds that "(1) the cases involve[d] damages rather
than injunctive relief; and (2) there was no public interest requir-
ing full and truthful disclosure."' 24 However, Touche Ross and
Transamerica cannot be distinguished so easily. Both cases held
that the implication of any private remedy from a federal statute
is a matter of statutory construction. 2 - Moreover, the informa-
tional purpose of section 13(d) is not unique in federal securities
115. 495 F. Supp. at 97.
116. Id. at 98-99.
117. Id. at 98.
118. Id. at 101.
119. 495 F. Supp. 488 (V.D. Mich. 1980).
120. Id. at 490-92. To remedy the purchaser's violation of section 13(d), the court
enjoined Bliss & Laughlin Industries from acquiring any additional stock in Kirsch for a
period of 30 days. This period of suspension, however, would not commence until Bliss &
Laughlin filed a truthful Schedule 13D and mailed a copy of its Schedule 13D to each
Kirsch shareholder of record as of the date of the violation. Id. at 502.
121. Id. at 489.
122. Id. at 490.
123. Id. at 491.
124. Id.
125. 442 U.S. at 568; 444 U.S. at 15. Indeed, the Court in Transamerica applied the
Touche Ross statutory construction standard in determining whether section 215 of the
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law; all federal securities laws, including those construed in
Touche Ross and Transamerica, have as their fundamental pur-
pose the disclosure of information for the benefit of the investing
public. 126
Exactly one month after Kirsch was decided, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin chose to reject Kirsch in Sta-
Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 127 by dismissing an issuing
corporation's suit for injunctive relief under section 13(d). In so
dismissing, the court "concur[red] with the reasoning of the Gate-
way court and its application of the Touche [Rossj and Tran-
samerica decisions to private causes of action under § 13(d)."' 128
The district court's opinion stressed the express damage rem-
edy available to purchasers and sellers under section 18(a) as well
as the ability of the SEC to seek enforcement under section 21.129
The court did recognize as a "legitimate concern," the fact "that
relief may not be expeditiously obtained by going through the
SEC as opposed to quick access to the courts."'130 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that "[a]bsent any expression of congressional
intent to provide an avenue of private equitable relief. . ." it
would not "follow the precedent which implies such swift access
by private litigants to the courts under § 13(d) .. ,13
In summary, Milstein, Dan River and Kirsch conclude that, ab-
sent private enforcement by the issuing corporation, section
13(d)'s disclosure purpose is thwarted. Private enforcement of the
securities laws "provides a necessary supplement to Commission
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), afforded implied private equitable relief. 444 U.S.
at 18-19.
126. See generally H.Rl Doc. No. 95, supra note 28, at 60-64. The Court in Touche
Ross noted, "In this case, the § 17(a) reports ... enable the Commissioner. . . [to] moni-
tor the financial health of brokerage firms and protect customers from the risks involved in
leaving their cash and securities with broker-dealers." 442 U.S. at 570. Thus, section 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), provides for the disclosure of information for the benefit of
investors. In Transamerica, the Court noted that section 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976),
"broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful. . . to
engage in specified transactions with clients without making requireddisclosures." 444 U.S.
at 16 (emphasis added).
127. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
128. Id. at 362. The district court appears to have misread Touche Ross and Tran-
samerica as to the nature of relief denied, interpreting the cases as denying "implied pri-
vate equitable enforcement rights." Id. (emphasis added). Touche Ross and Transamerica
denied implied private damage remedies, 442 U.S. at 578, 444 U.S. at 24. Whether this
misunderstanding affected the court's decision is uncertain.
129. Id. at 361-63. See notes 282-84 infra and accompanying text.
130. 494 F. Supp. at 363.
131. Id.
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action."1 32 This conclusion is rooted in the notion espoused by
the Court in Borak that judicial relief should be available when
necessary to achieve the result sought by Congress.133
Gateway and Sta-Rite conclude that the line of authority flow-
ing from the 1964 decision in Borak can no longer be considered
as controlling' 34 -a conclusion derived from the holdings of
Touche Ross and Transamerica. Touche Ross, while not overrul-
ing Borak, limits the precedential authority of Borak to its facts:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that
of the Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases
since Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the im-
plication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter
standard today. 13 5
In Transamerica, the Court also limits Borak:
While some opinions of the Court [(such as Borak)] have
placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to
132. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
133. Id. at 432-33.
134. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. at 96, states that: "The
decline of Borak renders less than compelling the authority... finding an implied private
right of action existent under section 13(d)." Accord, Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc.,
494 F. Supp. at 361. Professor Loss has commented that Borak "reached the right result
not for the wrong reason but for no reason at all." 5 L. Loss, SEculurIEs REGULATION
2882 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
135. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578. In the previous term, the Court
had described Borak as an unexplained deviation from the normal pattern ofjudicial im-
plication:
mhe Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes
that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at large.
[Citations omitted.] The Court has deviated from this pattern on occasion. See
J.. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 [1964] (implying a cause of action under a
securities provision describing "unlawful conduct"); Superintendent ofInsurance v.
Bankers Lfe & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 [1971] (implying a cause of action
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5. . .); Machinists v. Cen-
tral.Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 [1963] (implied cause of action under section of the
Railway Labor Act.. .). At least the latter two cases can be explained histori-
cally, however. In Superintendent of Insurance, the Court explicitly acquiesced in
the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal courts of a Rule lOb-5 cause of
action. [Citations omitted.] In Machinists, the Court explicitly followed the lead
of various earlier cases in which it had implied causes of actions under various
sections of the Railway Labor Act ....
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13 (1979). Cannon held that
section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976),
does afford a private cause of action to remedy sex discrimination in federally funded edu-
cation programs. See notes 246-47 nfra and accompanying text. See generally Note, The
Federal Securities Acts: The Demise of The Implied Private .Rights Doctrine?, 1980 U. ILL
L.F. 627 (identifying a dual implied private rights doctrine as illustrated by a comparison
of statutes which create a distinct federal right in the plaintiff (Cannon) with federal regula-
tory statutes designed to benefit the public at large (Touche Ross)).
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effectuate the purposes of a given statute,. . . what must ulti-
mately be determined is whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy asserted ... 36
Because the Borak standard for implication has been discred-
ited, it is necessary to illuminate the current Supreme Court stan-
dard for implying private causes of action from the federal
securities laws.
II. THE SUPREME COURT STANDARD FOR
IMPLYING CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Borak and Its Progeny
In J Case Co. v. Borak,137 the Supreme Court sustained an
implied cause of action for remedial relief in favor of shareholders
for losses resulting from deceptive proxy solicitations in violation
of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.138 Borak set forth a two-
part test for implication of private remedies under the federal se-
curities laws: If the statute's "chief purpose" is to benefit the
plaintiffW3 9 and if the implication of a remedy is necessary to effec-
tuate Congress' purpose in enacting the statute, then an implied
private remedy is appropriate."4
A decade later, the Supreme Court in National Railroad Pas-
senger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers (Am-
trak)t41 and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour 42
limited Borak by using the principle of statutory construction ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius--the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another. 43 In Amtrak, the National Association
of Railroad Passengers brought an action to. enjoin Amtrak's
planned cancellation of certain passenger trains, alleging that Am-
trak's action would violate section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger
136. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 15-16.
137. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
138. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
139. 377 U.S. at 432.
140. Id. at 433. See also Note, supra note 135, at 631; Comment,4n 4nalyticalFrame-
workfor Implied Causes of-4ctiozz Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act and Reding.
ton v. Touche Ross & Co., 59 B.U. L. REv. 157, 163 (1979).
141. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
142. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
143. 414 U.S. at 458; 421 U.S. at 418-20. Borak never considered whether the availa-
bility of SEC enforcement should trigger the use of the exclusio rule. 377 U.S. at 432.
Justice Clark wrote: "Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supple-
ment to Commission action." Id.
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Service Act of 1970.14 The Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit 4 ' and held that section 307(a)
of the Act does not create a private cause of action'46 because "the
remedies created in § 307(a) [enforcement by the Attorney Gen-
eral147 ] are the exclusive means to enforce the duties and obliga-
tions imposed by the Act."' 4 8
The Barbour Court addressed the issue of whether customers
have an implied cause of action under the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act of 1970 to compel the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation to act.' 4 9 Citing Amtrak for the exclusio rule,150 Bar-
bour reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 51 and
held that the SEC has the exclusive authority to bring suit against
the Corporation under the Act.'52
B. Cort v. Ash
In 1975, the Supreme Court incorporated elements of Borak
and Amtrak in formulating a then-definitive four-part test for im-
plying private remedies for violations of federal statutes. In Cort
v. Ash, 153 a stockholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation brought a
derivative suit for injunctive relief and damages, charging that the
Bethlehem corporate directors violated a criminal statute by mak-
ing unlawful presidential campaign contributions. 54 In an opin-
ion by Justice Brennan, the Court first dismissed the shareholder's
claim for injunctive relief, noting that the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974,155 enacted after the court of ap-
peals' decision, constituted controlling intervening law. 156 The
Amendments allowed the Federal Election Commission to receive
citizen complaints and authorized the Attorney General to seek an
144. 414 U.S. at 454-55. Section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act is set forth in
45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
145. Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
146. 414 U.S. at 464-65.
147. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976).
148. 414 U.S. at 458.
149. 421 U.S. at 413-14.
150. Id. at 419.
151. SEC v. Guaranty Bond and Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974). Barbour was
acting as the receiver for Guaranty.
152. 421 U.S. at 424.
153. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
154. Id. at 68. The statute at issue was section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976).
155. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
156. 422 U.S. 74 (1975).
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injunction. Accordingly, the Court held that these Amendments
relegated the shareholder's complaint for injunctive relief to the
Federal Election Commission. 15 7
The shareholder's action for damages was also dismissed, but
for different reasons. The Court held: "[I]mplication of such a
federal cause of action is not suggested by the legislative context
of § 610 [of the Federal Election Campaign Act] or required to
accomplish Congress' purposes in enacting the statute."' 158 Justice
Brennan listed "several factors" which were "relevant" to the
Court's decision:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," t s'591-that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indi-
cation of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one?' 601 Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintifft 16 11 And finally, is the cause of ac-
tion one traditionally relegated to state law. . . so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law?1 621
The Court denied the damage remedy after answering the first
three questions in the negative and the last question in the posi-
tive.163
The four factors which Justice Brennan indicated only as "rel-
evant" retained their vitality until the Supreme Court modified
157. Id. at 74-77.
158. Id. at 69.
159. Id. at 78 (citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (empha-
sis supplied)). Rigsby was the first case in which the Court implied a private remedy from a
federal statute. The first case to imply a private remedy under the federal securities laws
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (private cause of
action for damages under the Exchange Act's rule 10b-5).
160. 422 U.S. at 78 (citing, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak)).
161. Id. (citing, e.g., Amtrack; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412, 423 (1975); and Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)).
162. Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); cf. Bivens v. Six Un-
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1971); id. at 400 (Harlan, J., con-
curring); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964)).
163. First: The "protection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern."
422 U.S. at 81. Second: legislative silence would be overcome only if it were "clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights . I. " d. at 82. Third: "Recov-
ery of derivative damages by the corporation.. . would not cure the influence which the
use of corporate funds ... may have had on a federal election." Id. at 84. Finally: The
plaintiff's action for the directors' breach of their fiduciary duty in a state court was held to
be an adequate remedy. Id.
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the fourth Cort factor in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industies, Inc. 164 In
Piper, the Court weighed the merits of an implied cause of action
under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and concluded that "a
tender offeror, suing in its capacity as a takeover bidder, does not
have standing to sue for damages.under § 14(e)." 165
In applying the four-part Cort test, Chief Justice Burger, writ-
ing for the majority, reasoned that under the first Cort factor, the
issuing corporation's shareholders and not the tender offeror were
to be especially benefited by the Williams Act. 166  Under the
second Cort factor, he determined that it was Congress' intent to
curb the unregulated activities of tender offerors. This purpose,
therefore, negated the contention that tender offerors should be
given an implied private damage remedy. 167 Under the third Cort
factor, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that awarding damages to a
defeated tender offeror would not be consistent with the congres-
sional purpose of protecting the issuing corporation's sharehold-
ers. 68 Indeed, that corporation's shareholders would indirectly
bear the burden of satisfying a damage award against the is-
suer. 1
69
In addressing the fourth Cort factor, Chief Justice Burger rec-
ognized the "pervasiveness of federal securities regulation,"' 70
which would apparently justify an implied cause of action. He
then stated, however, that since the tender offeror would probably
164. 430 U.S. 1, 40-42 (1977). See Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the Williams Act4fter
Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 171-73 (1978).
165. 430 U.S. at 42 n.28. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, as added by the Williams
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 457 (1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), is a
broad antifraud provision which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
soliciation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, re-
quest, or invitation.
For a definition of a tender offer see note 33 supra.
166. 430 U.S. at 37.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 39.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 40. When the Williams Act was passed, only one state had laws which
governed tender offers. See VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528-.1-541 (1968); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 60,201-14. Over half of the states now have tender offer laws. See Subcomm.
on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the ABA Comm. on Federal Regulation of
Securities, State Takeover Statutes and The Williams Act, reprinted in 32 Bus. LAW. 187
(1976); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitution-
ality, 45 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1 (1976).
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be able to maintain "a cause of action under common-law princi-
ples of interference with a prospective commercial advantage,"' 7'
that it would be entirely appropriate to relegate the tender of-
feror's claim to a state court. Under this analysis, the final Cort
factor's inquiry into whether the cause of action is traditionally
relegated to state law becomes virtually irrelevant. The Pitier test,
instead, relegates the plaintiff to the state court whenever there is
thepossibility of a common-law cause of action.' 72
C. The Current Standard
1. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
In 1979, the Supreme Court continued its evolution of the
standard for implied private causes of action in Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington 7 In that case, Touche Ross, a firm of certified pub-
lic accountants, had audited the accounts of Weis Securities, Inc.,
a brokerage firm. 17 4 After Weis became insolvent and was liqui-
dated,175 Redington was appointed trustee in the liquidation on
behalf of Weis' customers'76 and filed an action against Touche
Ross for $51 million in damages. Redington alleged that Touche
Ross made an "improper audit and certification of the 1972 Weis
financial statements and preparation of answers to the Exchange
financial questionnaire [in violation of section 17(a) of the Ex-
change Act].'" 77 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that section 17(a) imposed a duty of care on accountants in
171. 430 U.S. at 40-41.
172. For a discussion of the Piter Court's treatment of the fourth Cort factor, see Pitt,
note 164 supra, at 171-73.
173. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
174. Id. at 563.
175. Id. at 564.
176. Id. at 565.
177. Id. at 565-66. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation also was seeking
$14 million in damages. Id. In 1972, the date relevant to ToucheRoss, section 17(a), as set
forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), provided:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or dealer
who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member,
every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer registered pur-
suant to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods,
such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records,
and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. Such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other
records shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable peri-
odic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representatives of the
Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 17 was substantially amended in 1975. The present section 17(a)(l) contains essen-
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the preparation of audits'7 8 and concluded that a breach of this
section 17(a) duty "gives rise to an implied private right of action
"1179for damages in favor of a broker-dealer's customers ....
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a seven to one majority of the
Supreme Court,80 began: "Once again, we are called upon to de-
cide whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. During this Term alone, we have been asked to
undertake this task no fewer than five times in cases in which we
have granted certiorari."'' In reversing the Second Circuit, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, using Justice Brennan's original language from
Cort, referred to the factors expressed there as being only "rele-
vant": "[Cort] did not decide that each of these factors is entitled
to equal weight. The central inquiry remains [the second Cort
factor-]whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or
by implication, a private cause of action."' 82 Justice Rehnquist
analyzed the issue of congressional intent by focusing on three ele-
ments of statutory construction: statutory language,'83 the legisla-
tive history of the statute 84 and the overall statutory scheme,
including an application of the exclusio rule. 85
a. Language-Does the language purport to create a private
remedy? 86 In answering this initial question, Justice Rehnquist
pointed to two helpful indices. First, the language must at least
prohibit certain conduct or create a federal right in favor of pri-
vate parties.' 8 7 In concluding that the language of section 17(a)
tially the same language as the first sentence of the 1970 version of section 17(a). Compare
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976).
178. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1978).
179. Id. at 622.
180. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion applying all four Cori factors. 442 U.S.
at 580-83. See notes 208-14 infra and accompanying text. Justice Powell took no part in
the determination of the case.
181. 442 U.S. at 562 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)).
182. 442 U.S. at 575. "The present Court, mindful of preserving the vitality of demo-
cratic processes, may be more deferential to the legislative judgments, it is more likely to
give some weight to federalism, and it is more conventional in demanding compliance with
jurisdictional and standing requirements." Powell, What the Justices are Saying, 62
A.B.A.J. 1455 (1976).
183. 442 U.S. at 569-71.
184. Id. at 571.
185. Id. at 571-74.
186. Id. at 568.
187. Id. at 569 (citing, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (fed-
eral right to receive equality of treatment in federally funded education programs regard-
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does not prohibit conduct or create rights, Justice Rehnquist noted
that section 17(a) requires only that certain individuals keep
records and file reports as prescribed by the SEC.' Second, the
language must not be forward-looking and seeking to forestall an
event, but must instead be retrospective and provide recompense
after the event."8 9 Justice Rehnquist stated that section 17(a) is
forward-looking because it seeks to forestall insolvency of broker-
dealers by providing the Commission with sufficient warning of
the financial collapse of a broker-dealer. Section 17(a), he con-
cluded, does not reflect on an event such as insolvency and does
not seek to provide recompense. 190 After applying these two fac-
tors, Justice Rehnquist answered the first question in the negative
and concluded that the language of the statute did not purport to
create a private remedy.' 91
b. Legislative histor--Does the legislative history suggest an
intent by Congress to either create or deny private remedies? 92 In
answering this question, Justice Rehnquist warned that if the leg-
islative history is silent, then "implying a private right of action
.. . is a hazardous enterprise, at best."'193 With respect to section
17(a), Justice Rehnquist stated that "the legislative history of the
1934 Act simply does not speak to the issue of private remedies
under § 17(a)."' 94 He found, therefore, no support for an implied
private remedy. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the legislative
history does not support a finding that Congress intended to create
an implied private right for the enforcement of section 17(a).
less of sex); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (federal right to
receive equal employment opportunities regardless of race); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (fraud is prohibited conduct under the Ex-
change Act); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (federal right to
convey a leasehold of realty coupled with a club membership regardless of race); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (federal right to vote regardless of state regula-
tions which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of race); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (federal right to purchase a home regardless of
race); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (the issuance of false or misleading proxy
solicitation materials is prohibited conduct under the Exchange Act)).
188. 442 U.S. at 569. See note 177 supra.
189. 442 U.S. at 570 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79).
190. Id. at 570-71. See note 177 supra.
191. 442 U.S. at 571.
192. Id.
193. Id But see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432, stating: "While this language
[section 14(a)] makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief
purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result."
194. 442 U.S. at 576.
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c. Statutory scheme-Does the statutory scheme allow for a
private remedy? 95 Justice Rehnquist, citing two reasons, an-
swered this question in the negative. First, he thought it highly
improbable that Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention animplied private action.1 96 Since section 17(a) is flanked by section
16(b) 197 and section 18(a)"'9  of the Exchange Act, both of which
explicitly grant private causes of action, it seems evident that Con-
gress certainly could have created a private remedy in section
17(a) if it had so intended. 99 Second, Justice Rehnquist applied
the exclusio rule, stating that when a statute expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, a court must be cautious of read-
ing other remedies into the statute.2°° Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged that section 18(a) may have been intended to be the
exclusive remedy for misstatements in reports filed with the
SEC.2 ' Yet, the Court declined to decide whether section 18(a)
195. Id. at 571.
196. Id. at 572 (referring to Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 741 (Powell,
J., dissenting)). In Cannon, after pointing out that in the four years after Cort was decided
twenty courts of appeals' decisions implied private actions from federal statutes, Justice
Powell remarked: "It defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Congress ab-
sentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(b) was designed to protect outside share-
holders against short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information.
"Short-swing transactions in securities are those in which a purchase and sale or sale and
purchase by the same person occur within a six month period." D. VAGTs, supra note 3, at
833. Section 16(b), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer
in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same thereafter ....
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976),
provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any applica-
tion, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided
in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or mis-
leading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discre-
tion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
199. 442 U.S. at 572.
200. Id. at 572-74.
201. Specifically, the Court noted that:
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provided the exclusive remedy for a violation of section 17(a).
Justice Relnquist instead reasoned that because the remedial pro-
visions of section 18(a) were enacted contemporaneously with sec-
tion 17(a), the Court would remain extremely reluctant to imply
from section 17(a) a remedy broader than that provided in section
18(a).202
The plaintiff in Touche Ross, Redington, argued that the
Court's inquiry under Cort should not end with statutory con-
struction; the Court should also consider whether an implied pri-
vate remedy was necessary to effectuate Congress' purpose in
passing the statute and whether the action was one traditionally
relegated to state law.2"3 Redington contended that such consider-
ations supported the cause of action, urging that private enforce-
ment of section 17(a) was an essential supplement to SEC action
and that section 17(a) was "a matter of federal, not state, con-
cern." 204 Justice Rehnquist responded that the four Cort factors
were merely "relevant" and not necessarily entitled to equal
weight.205 He reasoned that, since all three statutory construction
questions were answered in the negative, Congress obviously did
not intend to create either an express or an implied private remedy
under section 17(a).216
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that all four Cort fac-
tors should be examined, not just the second Cort factor regarding
Senator Fletcher in introducing the bill that formed the basis for the 1934 Act,
stated that "Section [18] imposes civil liability for false or misleading statements
in any of the reports or records required under this act." Richard Whitney, Presi-
dent of the New York Stock Exchange, testified at length regarding the 1934 Act
proposals. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, he
indicated his understanding that § 18(a) liability extended to "persons transacting
business in securities."
Id. at 574 n.15 (emphasis supplied).
202. Id. at 573. But see Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
that a cause of action may be maintained under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, even
though the defendant's conduct also constitutes a violation of section 18(a)).
203. 442 U.S. at 575.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 575-76. Redington, citing Borak, also argued that section 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976) (set forth in note 62 supra), grants jurisdiction to federal courts over viola-
tions of the Exchange Act. Id. at 576. In response, Justice Rehnquist stated:
The reliance... on § 27 is misplaced. Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts and provides for venue and service of process. It creates no cause of
action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs'
right must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which
they seek to enforce, not in thejurisdictional provision .... The Court in.8orak
found a private cause of action implicit in § 14(a).
Id. at 577.
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legislative intent.2 °7 Justice Marshall would have answered the
first Cori factor in the affirmative because brokerage firm custom-
ers were the "favored wards" of section 17(a) and were, therefore,
to be especially benefited by the statute.2 °8 In analyzing the
second Cort factor, Justice Marshall employed Justice Rehnquist's
three-pronged statutory construction inquiry. First, Justice Mar-
shall determined that the statutory language creates a private rem-
edy because section 17(a) "does impose duties for the benefit of
private parties; in that sense, it both generates expectations, on
which customers may appropriately rely, that those duties will be
performed, and prohibits conduct inconsistent with the obliga-
tions created. ' 20 9 Second, he acknowledged the silence of legisla-
tive history as to private remedies under section 17(a).210 Third,
Justice Marshall argued that the exclusio rule should not apply to
section 17(a) because the damage remedy in section 18(a) is of no
help to brokerage customers. He noted that "false reports regard-
ing a broker's financial condition would not affect the price of se-
curities held by the broker's customers,"'21  and hence would not
generate damages under section 18(a).21 2 Justice Marshall con-
cluded, therefore, that the second Cori factor should have been
satisfied.
Justice Marshall agreed with Redington that the third Cort
factor should have been answered affirmatively because private
enforcement of section 17(a) is necessary to supplement Commis-
sion action.21 3 He also agreed that the fourth Cort factor should
have been supportive because "enforcement of [the Exchange
Act's] ...reporting provisions is plainly not a matter of tradi-
tional state concern, but rather relates to the effectiveness of fed-
eral statutory requirements. ' 214 Thus, Justice Marshall would
have held all of the Cort factors to have been satisfied and would
have implied a private damage remedy under section 17(a).
2. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis
The most recent case to address the issue of implied private
207. Id. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 581 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at.582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. See note 198 supra.
213. 442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 582-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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causes of action, Transamerica MortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis,215
applied the Touche Ross standard of implication to two sections of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act).216 Lewis,
a shareholder of a trust which Transamerica advised and man-
aged, brought a derivative action on behalf of the trust and a class
action on behalf of the trust's shareholders.217 Lewis sought dam-
ages for an alleged breach of Transamerica's fiduciary duty under
section 206 and rescission of the contract under section 215 of the
Advisers Act.218 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that an implied private remedy for damages existed under section
206 and a similar right to equitable relief existed under section
215.219
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of ap-
peals' decision regarding the right of rescission under section 215.
Justice Stewart wrote that section 215 of the Advisers Act did af-
215. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See Underwood, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's D fnition of an Implied Right of Action, 7 PEp-
PER NE L. REv. 533 (1980).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (1976).
217. 444 U.S. at 13.
218. Id. Section 206, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or pro-
spective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to
or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect [sic] any sale or purchase of any security for the
account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the com-
pletion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall
not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker
or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this para-
graph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Section 215, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every
contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the vio-
lation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any
provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provi-
sion, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such
contract was in violation of any such provision.
219. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 239 (9th Cir. 1978).
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ford a private right of action; the language of section 215 on its
face renders void all contracts made in violation of the Advisers
Act. Justice Stewart observed: "By declaring certain contracts
void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of
voidness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere." 0
The more difficult question facing the Court was whether sec-
tion 206 afforded Lewis a private right of action for damages. In a
five to four decision on this issue, the Court held that section 206
does not afford a private damage remedy. 2 Justice Stewart,
again writing for the majority, reached this holding by declaring
that the central issue was whether Congress intended to create a
private damage remedy under section 206.22 To determine con-
gressional intent, Justice Stewart employed the Touche Ross statu-
tory construction analysis and inquired into the statute's language,
legislative history and scheme of enforcement.
Justice Stewart answered the first Touche Ross question in the
negative, noting that the statutory language neither created nor
altered any civil liabilities.22  He answered the second Touche
Ross question in the negative also, asserting that there was posi-
tive evidence of congressional intent not to authorize private dam-
age actions under section 206.2  In answering the third Touche
Ross question, Justice Stewart noted that the Advisers Act pro-
vides express remedies for enforcing section 206.1 Therefore,
Justice Stewart concluded that the exclusio rule applied to section
206 and eliminated the possibility of implied remedies.226 The
Court held, in accordance with Touche Ross, that negative re-
sponses to the three Touche Ross questions constituted sufficient
evidence of congressional intent to deny a private damage rem-
edy.22 7
220. 444 U.S. at 18.
221. Id. at 24 (Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J., join Stewart, J.
White, J., was joined in dissent by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.).
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Id. at 19, 24.
224. Id. at 21-22. Justice Stewart pointed out that the early drafts of section 214, the
Advisers Act's jurisdictional provision, gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by" the statute.
Id. (emphasis supplied). Section 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976), as finally enacted "omit-
ted any references to 'actions at law' or to 'liability.' Id. at 22. "The unexplained dele-
tion of a single phrase . . is, of course, not determinative. . . . But it is one more piece
of evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action for anything beyond
limited equitable relief." Id.
225. Id. at 20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, 80b-9, 80b-17 (1976).
226. Id. at 19-20.
227. Id. at 23-24.
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The dissent in Transamerica paralleled the dissent in Touche
Ross by arguing that the proper standard for implication was the
entire four-part Cort test. Justice White, writing for the dissent,
found that the first Cort factor had been satisfied because section
206 was intended to protect investors like the plaintiff. 8 He dis-
puted the majority's treatment of Congress' intent under the
second Cort factor by taking issue with the majority's analysis of
the legislative history. According to Justice White, the legislative
history did not weigh against implication. 9 After determining
that the first two Cort factors were satisfied, Justice White ex-
amined the remaining Cort factors and decided that they militated
in favor of implication. 3 Because each of the Cort factors had
been satisfied, Justice White concluded that the Court should im-
ply a private damage remedy. 31
3. Congressional Criticism
Touche Ross and Transamerica have deemed congressional in-
tent to be the critical issue when an implied private cause of action
is asserted and have compelled courts to examine the statutory
language, the statute's legislative history and the enforcement
scheme of the pertinent statute. In recent amendments to the fed-
eral securities laws,2 2 Congress criticized Touche Ross' and Tran-
sameica's focus on "strict construction of statutory language and
expressed intent" as the standard for judicial implication of pri-
vate remedies.3 3 Congress praised the Borak opinion's rationale
which recognized a private remedy whenever it was necessary to
effectuate Congress' statutory purpose.' Congress intended:
228. Id. at 25 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White pointed out that the language of
section 206 is "substantially similar" to the language of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980), "both of which
have been held to create private rights of action for which damages may be recovered." Id.
at 25 n.l (citing Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)).
229. 444 U.S. at 31 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White dealt with the majority's dis-
cussion of the omission of the words "actions at law," discussed in note 224 supra, and
concluded that "the significance of this omission is delphic at best." 444 U.S. at 31 (White,
J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 34-36 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 36 (White, J., dissenting).
232. Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275
(1980).
233. H.R. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 n.6, reprimedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4810 n.6.
234. Id. at 28, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4810. See notes
60-68 supra.
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to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights
of action under this legislation [the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 19801, where the plaintiff falls within the class
of persons protected by the statutory provision in question.
Such a right would be consistent with and further Congress'
intent in enacting that provision, and such actions would not
improperly occupy an area traditionally the concern of statelaw.23 5
This criticism of Touche Ross and Transamerica, however, is
not dispositive of the question of an issuing corporation's standing
to seek implied injunctive relief under section 13(d) of the Wil-
hams Act; by its terms it is applicable only to the Small Business
Incentive Act. Nevertheless, the criticism appears to indicate what
Congress might consider to be the test for implication of private
remedies if the Williams Act were amended in the future.
III. THE APPLICATION OF TOUCHE ROSS TO SECTION 13(d)
A purchaser who has filed a false or misleading Schedule 13D
is liable for damages under section 18(a) to any person "who, in
reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a se-
curity at a price which was affected by such statement .... "I'
If no Schedule 13D is filed or the purchaser fails to remedy the
defective Schedule 13D, the SEC may seek injunctive relief under
section 21 to compel the filing of a truthful Schedule 13D.1 7 The
SEC, however, does not always expeditiously seek injunctive relief
in the federal courts.138 Under such circumstances, the task of en-
forcing section 13(d) and compelling the filing of a truthful Sched-
ule 13D becomes the responsibility of the issuing corporation and
its shareholders." 9 Yet, the issuer's shareholders generally lack
either the resources or the incentive to maintain an injunctive ac-
tion.24° Moreover, section 13(d) provides no cause of action for
the issuing corporation "seeking equitable or prophylactic re-
235. Id. at 29, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4811 (citing Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 198 supra).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
238. See notes 296-323 infra and accompanying text.
239. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,719 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972).
240. Id. The shareholders may be able to seek injunctive relief as a class, thereby de-
fraying the cost of obtaining equitable relief. But see note 289 infra. For the availability of
attorneys' fees, compare Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-92 (1970) (com-
pelling payment of litigation costs by the corporation which had violated the securities laws
rather than by plaintiffs) with Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240,
247-71 (1975) (denying recovery of attorneys' fees to the prevailing litigant).
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lief-not monetary damages--[in order] to take the necessary
steps to effectuate the purposes of section 13(d)."'24  Thus, the va-
lidity of an issuer's implied cause of action for injunctive relief
under section 13(d) must be determined by an application of
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington .42
A. Language-Does the Language Purport to Create
a Private Remedy?
If a court seeks to imply a private cause of action for injunctive
relief on behalf of an issuing corporation, it must address the first
Touche Ross question: Does the language of section 13(d) suggest
an intent by Congress to create such a private remedy?243 Section
13(d) reads in pertinent part:
Any person who, [after acquiring certain stock], is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of
[certain stock] shall ... send to the issuer ... and file with the
Commission, a statement containing ... information ... as
the Commission may ... prescribe as necessary or apropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. '
To answer this first Touche Ross question, the court must de-
termine whether the statutory language either creates a federal
right in the plaintiff or prohibits certain conduct for the benefit of
the plaintiff.24 An example of a federal right created by statute
can be found in Cannon v. University of Chicago.246 In that case, it
was held that Title IX, with the admonition that "no person...
shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subject to discrimination," 247
vested plaintiff Cannon with the federal right not to be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex and accordingly implied a private
remedy to enforce that right. An example of statutory language
that prohibits conduct can be found in JL Case Co. v. Borak,248
where it was held that section 14(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits
improper proxy solicitation for the benefit of investors.249 Section
241. 453 F.2d at 720 n.22.
242. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See notes 173-214 supra and accompanying text.
243. 442 U.S. at 568.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 11979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra) (emphasis
added).
245. 442 U.S. at 569.
246. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
248. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
249. 377 U.S. at 431. According to Justice Clark, "the purpose of 14(a) is to prevent
management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of de-
ceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation." Id.
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14(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the [jurisdic-
tional means] ... in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy.
°
In contrast to Title IX, which creates a federal right, and sec-
tion 14(a), which prohibits conduct, the terms of section 13(d) only
require the purchaser to send a Schedule 13D to the SEC and the
issuing corporation. The issuing corporation has the right to re-
ceive a truthful Schedule 13D, but this "right" is granted for the
direct benefit of the issuer's shareholders, not for the benefit of the
corporation in its issuing capacity35 1 Thus, as one court has
noted, "Section 13(d) does not by its terms create or alter civil
liability; rather, it simply requires certain conduct. '252
The statutory language inquiry of Touche Ross also considered
whether the language of the statute is forward-looking or retro-
spective.253 If the language is forward-looking, it weighs against
implication. If the language is retrospective, it weighs in favor of
implication.254 The language of section 13(d) is similar to the lan-
guage of section 17(a) which was construed in Touche Ross.2"
Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part: "[Elvery broker or dealer
registered pursuant to.. .this title, shall make, keep, andpreserve
...such accounts, corresondence,.., and make such reports, as
the Commission. . .may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 256 Justice
Rehnquist determined that this language was forward-looking:
"In terms, § 17(a) simply requires broker-dealers and others to
...file such reports as the Commission may prescribe. It does
not, by its terms, purport to create a private cause of action in
favor of anyone. ' 25 7 Similarly, the language of section 13(d) is
forward-looking in that purchasers "shall send" certain reports
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 61 supra) (emphasis added).
251. See notes 324-26 infra and accompanying text.
252. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. 92, 99 (N.D. MlL 1980),
discussed in text accompanying notes 100-18 supra.
253. 442 U.S. at 570.
254. See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
255. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Wis. 1980), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
256. 15 U.S.C. 78q(a) (1976) (set forth in full in note 177 supra) (emphasis added).
257. 442 U.S. at 569.
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"in the public interest or for the protection of investors."' ' 8 Thus,
under Touche Ross, section 13(d) seems to weigh against implica-
tion.
An example of retrospective language can be found in section
215 of the Advisers Act259 which was scrutinized in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.2" Section 215 reads in pertinent
part: "Every contract made in violation .. .[of this subchapter]
...shall be void .... ,,26' Transamerica implied a private rem-
edy from this language, stating: "By declaring certain contracts
void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of
voidness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere."262 Thus,
section 215 provides recompense after the occurrence of violative
conduct. If a contract is made in violation of the Advisers Act,
section 215 provides that such a contract shall be void. While sec-
tion 215 provides a remedy for a wrong, however, section 13(d)
does not; section 13(d) merely requires purchasers to send a
Schedule 13D to the SEC and to the issuing corporation. It ap-
pears, therefore, that section 13(d) was intended to forestall harm
to the shareholder, rather than to provide recompense for wrong-
doing.263
The terms of section 13(d) neither create a federal right in the
issuing corporation, nor prohibit conduct for the benefit of the is-
suer. Moreover, the language of section 13(d) is forward-looking
rather than retrospective. Thus, the language of section 13(d) does
not suggest an intent by Congress to create a private cause of ac-
tion for injunctive relief in the issuing corporation. Accordingly,
the first Touche Ross statutory construction question must be an-
swered in the negative.
B. Legislative History-Does The Legislative History Suggest
an Intent by Congress to either Create
or Deny Private Remedies?
In determining the propriety of implication, Touche Ross next
considered whether the legislative history purports to create or
258. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 supra).
260. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See notes 214-31 supra and accompanying text.
261. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (set forth in part in note 218 supra) (emphasis added).
262. 444 U.S. at 18-19. See L. Loss, 3 SEcuRITIEs REGULATIONS 1758-59 (2d ed.
1961). Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), is a voiding provi-
sion similar to section 215 of the Advisers Act. For an application of section 29(b), see
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970).
263. See notes 324-26 infra and accompanying text.
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deny private relief to a plaintiff. Although Congress was silent as
to private causes of action under section 13(d),2 4 the legislative
history of the Williams Act does offer some interpretive assistance.
Two pieces of legislative history appear to weigh in favor of impli-
cation, whereas other legislative history appears to weigh against
implication.
First, the House Report of the Williams Act notes that the
SEC believed that the Act would add little cost, if any, to the ad-
ministration of the securities laws.265 This comment, reflective of
the SEC's view and not that of Congress, suggests that the burden
of enforcement would be on private parties rather than on the
Commission.266 Second, Professor Israels, in a submission to the
hearings on the Williams Act, wrote:
Presumably we may assume that the Commission will be able
to enforce the provision of this Bill ... and of its rules there-
under by proceedings for injunction in the Federal courts; and
that under [Borak] a private litigant could seek similar relief
before or after the significant fact such as the acceptance of his
tender of securities.
This reasoning was asserted by the defeated tender offeror in ]iper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 261 who argued that since Congress
was aware of Borak when it passed the Williams Act, "Congress
was [also] aware that private actions were implicit in [the Williams
Act]." '269 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Piper,
rejected such logic:
[T]his conclusion places more weight on the passing reference
to [Borak ] than can be reasonably carried. Only last Term we
indicated that similar materials in the legislative history of the
264. Touche Ross warned that "implying a private right of action on the basis of con-
gressional silence is a hazardous enterprise at best." 442 U.S. at 571. This warning is not
very helpful, however, because if a private remedy is sought, the plaintiff will undoubtedly
have conceded the absence of an explicit private remedy. If Congress had spoken to the
issue, a court's task would be easy. As the Court in Transamerica pointed out, however,
"the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsis-
tent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available." 444 U.S. at 18 (citing
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 694).
265. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 49, at 7, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2817.
266. The Commission's "presumed 'expertise' in the securities-law field is of limited
value when the narrow legal issue is one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution, namely
whether a cause of action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particu-
lar class of litigants." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977).
267. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 67.
268. 430 U.S. at 31. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
at 32 n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
269. 430 U.S. at 31.
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1934 Act were of limited value. "Remarks of this kind made in
the course of legislative debate or hearings other than by per-
sons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a bill are
entitled to little weight." 2 ° "
The legislative history of the Williams Act does not uniformly
support implied causes of action. For example, the statement in
the House Report that the Williams Act "avoids tipping the bal-
ance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid"271 weighs against implica-
tion. Timing is crucial to the success or failure of takeover at-
tempts by the preliminary acquisition of stock on the open
market.272 Such acquisitions are often precursors of cash tender
offers273 and if a purchaser can be delayed in the takeover at-
tempt, the issuer can take advantage of several defensive tactics.274
Therefore, a private cause of action for injunctive relief in the
hands of the issuing corporation would provide an effective tool
for the delay and perhaps defeat a takeover attempt by the pur-
chaser.
Thus, it appears that the legislative history of section 13(d)
does not expressly speak to private causes of action nor does the
general legislative history of the Williams Act indicate an intent
by Congress to create such a remedy under section 13(d). Neither
the SEC's statement concerning the cost of enforcement nor Pro-
fessor Israels' remark about Borak is given appreciable weight by
the Court. Moreover, it may be argued that Congress' desire to
maintain neutrality weighs against implication because a private
cause of action for injunctive relief, if misused by the issuing cor-
poration, would frustrate Congress' express desire not to tip the
balance of regulation. The legislative history of section 13(d),
therefore, does not suggest congressional intent to create a private
270. Id. at 31, n.20 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976)).
271. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 49, at 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2813.
272. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 199 (1977).
273. I1d. at 10-14.
274. W. PAINTER, sutpra note 47, at 404 n.44. Defensive tactics include:
arranging a so-called "defensive" merger with another company .... repurchas-
ing shares, issuing more shares to a "friendly" party, increasing the dividend,
splitting the stock, reincorporating in a state which has relatively strict rules on
tender offers. . . , classifying the board of directors, amending the company's
articles of incorporation or bylaws to require a high percentage of shareholder
vote, or a class vote, to authorize mergers or other acquisitions, and inserting
provisions in loan agreements or pension plans accelerating the maturity date of
corporate obligations in the event of a change in control.
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cause of action for injunctive relief for the issuer. Thus, the
second Touche Ross statutory construction question must also be
answered in the negative.
C. Statutory Scheme-Does the Statutory Scheme Allow
for a Private Remedy?
The final question that Touche Ross posed to determine con-
gressional intent was whether the statutory scheme allows for the
implication of private remedies. In answering this question, Jus-
tice Rehnquist made two assumptions. The first assumption was
that Congress knows how to create express private causes of ac-
tion and, therefore, implied rights of action should be the excep-
tion, not the rule. 7 A plaintiff, however, could cite two occasions
upon which the Court has declined to afford conclusive weight to
this assumption; the Court has recognized implied causes of action
under section 14(a) in Borak 7 6 and under section 10(b) in Super-
intendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.277 As previ-
ously indicated, however, the Court has discredited Borak,278 and
Justice Rehnquist noted in Touche Ross that "this Court simply
• . . acquiesced in the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal
courts of an implied action under § 10(b)."27 9 In contrast, the his-
tory of implied private remedies under section 13(d) is limited to
the decade since 1971 when GAFCorp. v. Milstein28 was decided.
The second assumption made by Justice Rehnquist in Touche
Ross was that an express remedy in a statutory scheme excludes
all other remedies--the exclusio rule.28' A violation of section
13(d), like all other violations of the Exchange Act, is subject to an
explicit administrative remedy. The SEC has express authority to
investigate a section 13(d) violation under section 21(a),282 express
authority to bring suit for an injunction or writ of mandamus
under sections 21(d) and (e)283 and express authority to submit
evidence of any violation to the Attorney General for possible
275. 442 U.S. at 572. See note 57 supra.
276. 377 U.S. at 431. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
277. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
278. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
279. 442 U.S. at 577 n.19.
280. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See notes 81-90
supra and accompanying text.
281. 442 U.S. at 572-74.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
283. Id. §§ 78u(d)-(e).
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criminal proceedings against the violator under section 21(d).284
In accordance with this administrative remedy, an issuing cor-
poration which faces a purchaser who neglects to file a truthful
Schedule 13D should urge the SEC to seek an injunction under
section 21. It would then be within the SEC's discretion to pursue
the matter. Yet, the SEC may hesitate to bring suit when a take-
over is imminent. As Manuel F. Cohen, former Chairman of the
SEC, stated at the Williams Act hearings:
[O]ur concern really stems from sensitivity that the Govern-
ment should stay out of involvement in these contests as much
as possible .... We just did not want the Commission to be in
the position perhaps of compelling changes or going to court
because once you do that no matter how well you qualify what
you are doing it is going to be used by the other parties as an
argument that "the Government is against you." This is the
reason why the Commission hesitates, unless no other course is
possible, to go to court on these situations.2",
Regardless of the SEC's hesitation, a strict application of the ex-
clusio rule would deny the issuer an implied cause of action for
injunctive relief under section 13(d).2 86
Thus, an issuing corporation, faced with a violation of section
13(d) by a purchaser, is left without the swift injunctive relief
which would compel a purchaser to file a truthful Schedule 13D.
Instead, the exclusio rule limits the issuer's remedy to the express
administrative remedy provided by section 21. Although this
technique of statutory construction may appear to sanction injus-
tice, a majority of the Touche Ross Court accepted the rule as a
method of limiting the implication of private remedies under the
federal securities laws.
Because Congress created an express administrative remedy
for the enforcement of the Exchange Act in section 21, the ex-
clusio rule and Touche Ross compel the conclusion that the statu-
tory scheme of section 13(d) does not suggest congressional intent
284. Id. § 78u(d). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976) (providing for criminal liability).
285. House Hearings, supra note 44, at 53 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen). Justice
Stevens, dissenting in Piper, stated:
Although originally one might have argued that the private remedies created by
the Securities Acts are limited to those expressly described in the legislation itself
history forecloses any such argument today. The statutes originally enacted in
1933 and 1934 have been amended so often with full congressional awareness of
the judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as implicitly creating a private remedy,
that we must now assume that Congress intended to create rights for the specific
beneficiaries of the legislation as well as duties to be policed by the SEC.
430 U.S. at 55 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
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to create a private cause of action for injunctive relief in the issu-
ing corporation. The third Touche Ross statutory construction
question, therefore, must also be answered in the negative.
In sum, Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car287 and
Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 288 applied the Touche Ross
statutory construction standard for implication and found that is-
suing corporations do not have an implied cause of action for in-
junctive relief under section 13(d). The language, legislative
history and statutory scheme of enforcement under section 13(d)
were held to weigh against implication.289
Pier v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. ,290 which predated Touche
Ross, did recognize that in special circumstances the Court should
look beyond principles of statutory construction to policy consid-
erations when implying a private remedy. Although Chief Justice
Burger denied the defeated tender offeror an implied damage
remedy in ]iper because it was "unncessary to ensure the fulfill-
ment of Congress' purposes in adopting the Williams Act,"29' he
nevertheless observed that private injunctive relief might be neces-
287. 495 F. Supp. 92, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See notes 100-18 supra and accompanying
text.
288. 494 F. Supp. 358, 363 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See notes 127-31 supra and accompany-
ing text.
289. The issuer in Gateway argued that if standing were denied to the corporation qua
corporation, then the issuing corporation should be granted standing as a representative of
its shareholders. The issuer's standing as a representative of its shareholders, however,
would still require a court to imply a private cause of action for the shareholders. The
Gateway court admitted that for a corporate shareholder, implication would be a "closer
question." 495 F. Supp. at 99. Further, Gateway stated, "[It is clear from the statutory
language and legislative history that shareholders are the intended beneficiaries of the dis-
closure requirements of section 13(d)." Id. at 100.
The plaintiff in Transamerica also appeared to be a member of a class to be especially
benefited by a federal statute (section 206 of the Advisers Act), but the language, legislative
history and scheme of enforcement of the statute dictated the denial of a private remedy.
See notes 215-31 supra and accompanying text. Justice Stewart wrote: "The mere fact
that the statute was designed to protect advisors' clients does not require the implication of
a private cause of action for damages on their behalf." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, Justice Stevens attempted to delineate the "espe-
cially benefited" factor as the "most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a
cause of action." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. The majority in
Transamerica, however, evidently rejected this factor as a litmus test for implication of
private causes of action. 444 U.S. at 20. Under the Touche Ross analysis, as applied by
Transamerica, the issuing corporation could not assert an implied remedy as a representa-
tive of its shareholders, because the shareholders themselves do not have an implied rem-
edy under section 13(d). Id. at 24.
290. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
291. Id. at 41.
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sary to provide for effective enforcement of the Williams Act.292
The Chief Justice remarked that "in corporate control contests the
stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest law-
suits, 'is the time when relief can best be given.' "293
According to this reasoning, Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Lim-
ited294  and Kirsch Co. v. Bliss and Laughlin Industries, Inc. 295
might have been correct in implying an injunctive action for the
issuing corporation. The validity of this conclusion, however, de-
pends upon finding that the policy of supplemental enforcement is
strong enough to override the strict principles of statutory con-
struction set forth in Touche Ross.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Supplemental Enforcement
Despite the fact that the SEC is expressly authorized to enforce
section 13(d) violations, the Commission admits that it is
overburdened and frequently unable to adequately police the Wil-
liams Act provisions.296 Consequently, the SEC contends that pri-
vate causes of action are necessary to effectuate the congressional
purpose of protecting investors, including an issuing corporation's
shareholders, through the Williams Act.297 Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redingon,293 however, rejected a similar argument: "We need
not reach the merits of the arguments concerning the 'necessity' of
implying a private remedy... , we believe such inquiries have
little relevance to the decision of this case. '299 Justice Rehnquist
reached this result by reasoning that negative responses to the stat-
utory construction questions were sufficient to indicate that Con-
gress did not intend to provide a private damage remedy under
292. Id. at 42 n.28.
293. Id. at 42 (citing Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969) (opinion by Friendly, J.)).
294. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981), discussed
in text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
295. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 119-26
supra.
296. The SEC insists that "'[even more necessary [than in Borak] are such private
rights of action to supplement SEC actions to effectuate the congressional purposes in en-
acting the Williams Act,' Brief for SEC asAmicus Curiae 12." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 64 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Piper majority rejected this argu-
ment. Id. at 41 n.27.
297. See 430 U.S. at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. 442 U.S. 560 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 173-214 supra.
299. 442 U.S. at 575.
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section 17(a) of the Exchange Act.3°  The plaintiff in Touche Ross
responded that a denial of supplemental enforcement sanctions
injustice. Yet, Justice Relmquist maintained that the Court is
"not at liberty to legislate. If there is to be a federal damages rem-
edy. . . Congress must provide it. '[I]t is not for [the Court] to fill
any hiatus Congress has left in this area.' ",301
Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of the supplemental en-
forcement argument, the burden on the SEC to enforce the federal
securities laws may be a substantial impediment to meaningful en-
forcement. Each year the SEC must review all of the filings re-
quired by the federal securities laws. Between 1969 and 1976, the
number of filings made with the SEC pursuant to the Williams
Act alone had increased from 321 to 1,184.302 Moreover, the SEC
annually receives several thousand complaints from private par-
ties seeking redress.3 °3 The SEC investigates between 1,000 to
1,500 of these complaints for possible violations of the federal se-
curities laws3 4 and institutes approximately 100 injunctive actions
annually.305
These figures illustrate the increasing burden upon the SEC
and indicate the necessity of supplemental enforcement. In 1971,
the GAF Corp. v. Milstein3 °6 opinion asserted: "It is no answer to
the query whether the issuer has standing to seek injunctive relief
to respond that the Commission can proceed under penal provi-
sions. 30 7 Yet nine years later, when the SEC's burden of enforc-
ing the securities laws had increased at least three-fold,30 8 Sta-Rite
300. Id. at 575-76.
301. Id. at 579 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (emphasis sup-
plied)).
302. Pitt, supra note 164, at 164 n.352. As the SEC indicated:
[L]itigation alleging fraud by one side or the other in a contested tender offer
occurs almost weekly. It is almost standard operating procedure. We have had to
respond that we will investigate allegations of fraud to the extent they fall within
our jurisdiction, and indeed we have. But owing to the time required for such
investigations, it may be that the tender offer will be all over before the investiga-
tion is completed.
House Hearings, supra note 44, at 19. When Piper was decided, the SEC's professional
staff in the Office of Tender Offers, Acquisitions and Small Issues was composed of only
four professionals. Pitt, supra note 164, at 164 n.356.
303. SEC, 36TH ANNUAL REPORT 93 (1970).
304. SEC, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT 121 (1979).
305. Id. at 122.
306. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
307. Id. at 721.
308. Compare SEC, 36TH ANNUAL REPORT 224 (1970) with SEC, 45TH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 122 (1979).
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Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. , adopting Gatewvay Industries,
Inc. v. Agency. Rent A Car's 0O reasoning, answered the issuer's
query with this response: "Instead, it is for the private issuing cor-
poration, or its shareholders, to raise the issue of noncompliance
initially with the SEC, and not the courts. It is then incumbent
upon the SEC to investigate and bring an action in district court if
it deems such to be necessary."' 31  It appears that these courts
have ignored an obvious fact: without supplemental enforcement
countless violations of section 13(d) will go unremedied and the
congressional purpose of closing the gap in the federal securities
laws will be undermined substantially.
The plaintiff in IL Case Co. v. Borak312 was successful when
he outlined such a scenario and the Court sustained his action in
the name of supplemental enforcement.3?1 3 Yet fifteen years later,
Touche Ross rejected the same argument:
The invocation of the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act is
similarly unavailing. Only last Term, we emphasized that gen-
eralized references to the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act
will not justify reading a provision "more broadly than its lan-
guage and the statutory scheme reasonably permit." The ulti-
mate question is one of Congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law.314
A significant deviation from this recent line of authority arose in
Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Limited, 5 where the Fourth Circuit ap-
parently chose to ignore Justice Rehnquist's rejection of the sup-
plemental enforcement argument, stating: "[A] court simply
cannot turn a blind eye to a potentially inaccurate filing when it
possesses the injunctive power to have that filing corrected before
irreparable harm occurs to the investing public. '316 It is presently
uncertain whether the supplemental enforcement argument, as it
applies to section 13(d), will be accepted by the federal courts
309. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
310. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. I 1980).
311. 494 F. Supp. at 362-63. See also 495 F. Supp. at 98.
312. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
313. Id. at 432.
314. 442 U.S. at 578 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 10.3, 116 (1978)). In Sloan, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the SEC did not have the authority under
section 12(k) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976), to issue a series of orders
suspending the trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day suspension period based on the
same set of circumstances. Id. at 114. The SEC had urged that such action was required
for the protection of investors. Id. at 114-15.
315. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
316. Id. at 1227.
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which have yet to consider the issue. It is noteworthy, however,
that the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Dan River.3 17
If this policy argument is accepted by other courts, as it was by
the Fourth Circuit in Dan River, the issuing corporation will gen-
erally be in the best position to assert an implied injunctive action:
The statute requires a copy of the statement to be sent by regis-
tered mail to the issuer (this provision alone might support the
issuer's standing), and the issuer, in the course of constantly
monitoring transactions in its stock, better than anyone else will
know when there has been a failure to fie. Moreover, the is-
suer has not only the resources, but the self-interest so vital to
318maintaining an injunctive action.
The shareholder, however, although able to gain access to the
Schedule 13D,31 9 does not have the issuing corporation's immedi-
ate access to the Schedule 13D. Likewise, the shareholder gener-
ally has neither the resources nor the incentive to pursue an
injunctive action.320 Moreover, even if a shareholder succeeded in
gaining an injunction against a purchaser, the shareholder could
not collect money damages unless he or she met the pur-
chaser/seller and reliance requirements of section 18(a).321
In short, the issuer's pursuit of an implied injunctive remedy is
a necessary supplement to SEC action.322 Without such enforce-
ment, the remedial purpose of the Williams Act would be virtually
defeated.323 Accordingly, the policy consideration of supplemen-
tal enforcement to achieve Congress' goal of disclosure under sec-
tion 13(d) weighs heavily in favor of implying private injunctive
relief on behalf of the issuing corporation.
B. The Williams Act's Neutrality
The neutrality which Congress intended to be an important
aspect of the Williams Act weighs against permitting an issuing
corporation private injunctive relief. Former Chairman of the
SEC, Manuel F. Cohen, testified before the Senate:
/7Theprincipalpoint is that we [the SEC] are not concerned with
317. 449 U.S. 1101 (Jan. 12, 1981).
318. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d at 719 (citation omitted).
319. Because the Schedule 13D must be sent to the SEC and to each exchange where
the security is traded, the Schedule becomes a matter of public record. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
320. 453 F.2d at 721.
321. Id See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
322. 624 F.2d at 1223, 1227; 453 F.2d at 721.
323. 453 F.2d at 720. Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488,492
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
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assisting or hurting either side. We are concerned with the inves-
tor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial wel-
fare.... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is
our concern and our only concern. 324
Professor Hayes, also before the Senate, stated that neither the
bidder nor the defending management require any additional pro-
tection: "Rather, the investor. . . is the one who needs a more
fectie champion . ... 325 Senator Williams made the statement
that the Williams Act was "designed solely to require full andfair
disclosurefor the benefit ofinvestors."326
As evidenced by this legislative history, Congress intended the
Williams Act to be scrupulously neutral and recognized that
"takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a
useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
management. ' 327 This policy was announced in response to crit-
ics of the Williams Act who believed that if incumbent manage-
ment were given any additional defensive weapons, those tender
offers which serve as the only realistic method of ousting ineffi-
cient management would be hampered.328 One such critic re-
minded Congress of an incident involving the Boston and Maine
Corporation. The president of that corporation, who had been
convicted of misappropriating corporate property, "was given a
raise in salary and an extension of his employment contract at the
time extensions of employment contracts were given to other of-
ficers and directors. 329 In such instances, takeover bids do serve
a useful purpose, and the Williams Act's neutrality would be upset
if the issuing corporation were given the opportunity to enjoin a
purchaser by invoking private relief under section 13(d).
A bidder preparing a takeover will often attempt to establish a
position in the target's securities before announcing a formal
324. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 178 (cited in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977) (emphasis in original)).
325. Id. at 57 (cited in 430 U.S. at 29 (emphasis supplied)).
326. 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (cited in 430 U.S. at 31 (emphasis supplied)).
327. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967) (cited in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1975)). See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
328. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. Tender offers had gained popular-
ity because proxy contests had become less effective for various reasons, including: "the
inertia of stockholders, the fact that management had the use of corporate funds to
purchase the securities of a disagreeing shareholder 'to protect corporate policy,' and the
existence of strong allies for management-the investment bankers, institutional lenders,
customers and suppliers, with whom management daily transacted business." Pitt, supra
note 164, at 127.
329. House Hearings, supra note 44, at 63 (statement of Jordan Eskin).
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tender offer 33° and such preliminary stock purchases often trigger
a duty to disclose under section 13(d).33' Consequently, when
such a strategy is in effect, the target issuer could forestall the
takeover by initiating litigation after the preparatory stock
purchases.332 This tactic, in the hands of incumbent management,
would certainly upset the neutrality of the Williams Act and could
frustrate the salutory effects of a takeover.
It is important to note that the scope of section 13(d) is not
limited to pre-tender offer acquisitions; any person who acquires a
five percent interest in the issuer must file a Schedule 13D.333 The
purchaser's future intentions do not bear on the obligation to file,
and the purchaser may desire nothing more than a strong voice in
the issuer's affairs. Nevertheless, the possibility of injunction
poses danger in this latter situation; the self-interest of manage-
ment may operate to still that legitimate voice by enjoining the
purchaser from voting his or her shares.
These concerns were acknowledged, but dismissed, by the Mil-
stein court:
To play upon management's self-interest, of course, raises some
threat to Congress's express desire not to tip the scales in favor
of incumbent management as against the takeover group. But,
this danger can be adequately counteracted if the district court
carefully scrutinizes self-serving management claims allegedly
made in the interest of investor protection.334
Although Milstein recognized this threat to the neutrality of the
Williams Act, it held private enforcement of section 13(d) by the
issuing corporation to be appropriate.335 The Second Circuit con-
cluded that since the SEC was overburdened and shareholders
lacked both the ability and the incentive to enforce section 13(d)
effectively, corporate action was a necessary supplement to SEC
action.336
In Gateway, the Court rejected Milstein's reasoning, and
stated: "It scarcely would further the goals of section 13(d) to per-
mit an issuing corporation to sue on behalf of some unidentified
330. E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 272, at 10-14.
331. Id.
332. Young, Section 13(d)--A New Element in The Battle For Control of Corporate
Managements: The Implications of GAF Corporation v. Milstein, 27 Bus. LAW. 1137, 1138
(1972).
333. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1 1979) (set forth in full in note 7 supra).
334. 453 F.2d at 719-20.
335. Id. at 720.
336. Id. at 721.
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group of shareholders who themselves may have no interest in
pursuing an action." '337 Gateways conclusion, however, is open to
criticism. Shareholders who are unidentified or disinterested are
precisely the persons to whom Congress extended the protections
of the Williams Act. Such shareholders are the "pawn[s]. . .lost
somewhere in the shuffle1338 who would benefit most from their
corporation's action under section 13(d). Notwithstanding Gate-
way's reasoning, such an action would further the goals of section
13(d).
Admittedly, the congressional intent not to favor one side or
the other in a takeover attempt might be threatened if an issuer
could pursue an injunction. This danger, however, must be
weighed against the inevitable result which would follow if the
issuing corporation could not pursue an injunction: violations of
the Williams Act would go unremedied. Congress intended the
Williams Act to close a gap in the disclosure provisions of the
securities laws. Without private enforcement by issuing corpora-
tions, this gap will remain open. Although neutrality is a real con-
cern, disclosure is more compelling. The concerns may be
balanced effectively, as noted by the Milstein court, if "the district
court carefully scrutinizes self-serving management claims alleg-
edly made in the interest of investor protection."339
V. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE WILLIAMS ACT
In July of 1979, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs wrote to the Chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Wil-
liams, concerning the enforceability of the Williams Act.3 t
Recognizing the Supreme Court's hesitance in granting private re-
lief,34 the Committee was "interested in reviewing whatever pro-
posals the SEC ha[d] developed in light of its experience to restore
to aggrieved persons access to the Federal courts in tender offer
situations. '342 The SEC responded in February of 1980 by reom-
337. Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, 495 F. Supp. at 101. Although the
majority of investors do not read the Schedule 13Ds which are filed, the sophisticated in-
vestor does read the material and act accordingly. Professor Painter's "trickle down" the-
ory asserts: "[I]f the prevailing market price of a security mirrors 'all the publicly available
information, greater disclosure must lead to greater market efficiency.'" Note, supra note
135, at 673 n.263 (citing W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 396).
338. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 178.
339. 453 F.2d at 719-20.
340. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 5.
341. Id. (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)).
342. Id.
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mending "the enactment of a provision dealing with private rights
of action for violations of the Williams Act provisions. 343 The
SEC cited the Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington344 and Transamer-
ica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis345 decisions as the impetus
for proposing an express private cause of action under the Wil-
liams Act.346
The SEC proposed to amend section 14 of the Exchange Act
by adding subsection (i) which would grant standing to sue to all
parties to a takeover attempt. Proposed section 14(i) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Any person who violates sections 13(d) [and/or the other
provisions of the Williams Act], shall be liable to: [an issuing
corporation or a shareholder of the issuer] .. .; who is ag-
grieved by such violation, and the person so aggrieved may
bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover
damages and seek such equitable relief, including divestiture of
securities acquired in violation of the [Williams Act] ... ;pro-
vided, however, that no person shall be liable for damages
under this subsection if he proves that he exercised reasonable
care in the circumstances.
In explanation of the proposal, the SEC reiterated its desire to
primarily benefit the shareholders of the issuer.348 Yet, the SEC
recognized:
[R]ealistically, individual shareholders (or even class represent-
atives) cannot always be expected to pursue such claims. The
secondary beneficiaries of the Williams Act--[the issuing cor-
porations]-are often in a better position to enforce the Act's
provisions in the face of transgressions than are shareholders.
Giving them a right of action will help deter violations of these
provisions in the course of battles for corporate control, and
consequently will assist in carrying out the Congressional poli-
cies underlying the Williams Act. 49
In order to ensure the effective enforcement of section 13(d) dis-
closure, Congress should be urged to act expeditiously and favora-
343. Id. at 79 (emphasis by the SEC).
344. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
345. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
346. Commission Report, supra note 53, at 80.
347. Id. at 96-97. Under the proposed section 14(i), in addition to injunctive relief, the
issuing corporation or its shareholders could sue for damages regardless of whether they
purchased or sold stock in reliance on a false filing as required under section 18(a). Pro-
posed section 14(i)(2) requires only that the person show that he or she did not have knowl-
edge of relevant facts which would be considered important in making investment
decisions. Id. at 97-98.
348. Id. at 119.
349. Id. at 119-20.
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bly upon this proposal. 5 °
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the present Court's strict statutory construction stan-
dard for implication, it appears that an issuing corporation does
not have an implied private remedy under section 13(d). If the
disclosure requirement of section 13(d) is to be effective, however,
the issuer must be able to supplement SEC action. Therefore,
Congress must legislate the proposed express private cause of ac-
tion for injunctive relief under the Williams Act. An express pri-
vate remedy would facilitate the effective enforcement of section
13(d) and close the gap in the federal securities laws, thereby
achieving the primary objective of the Williams Act.
EDWARD WINSLOW MOORE
350. The ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1978 Proposed Official Draft), reprintedin W. PAINTER,
supra note 47, would also expressly create a private cause of action for the issuing corpora-
tion and its shareholders. Section 1713 of the FED. SEC. CODE provides:
(b) On proof in an action by the issuer of a security that is the subject of a tender
offer (or a proposed tender offer) or whose acquisition requires a filing under
section 605(b) [similar to section 13(d) of the Exchange Act], a holder of such a
security (or of another security whose interests are adversely affected), a person
who has tendered a security pursuant to a tender offer, or a person who has made
or proposes to make a tender offer, that the defendant has violated, is violating, or
is about to violate section 605(b) . . . , a court may (1) enjoin a violation or
further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the voting of securities ac-
quired in violation or the consummation of action authorized by their having
been voted, (4) set aside action so consummated, (5) award damages against the
violator for any loss caused by his violation, or (6) grant other appropriate relief
(preliminary or final), including a combination of the types of relief here speci-
fied.
Id. at 416.
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